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Abstrak 
 
Konflik di Thailand Selatan antara pemerintah Thailand dan kelompok muslim Pattani menjadi 
satu gambaran konflik berkepanjangan ketika tidak adanya pihak ketiga yang menjadi mediator 
dalam konflik ini.  Jika dilihat dari durasinya, tuduhan satu dengan lainnya pada pihak yang 
berkonflik dan kematangan dari konflik itu sendiri maka, konflik Thailand Selatan sudah dapat 
dikategorikan sebagai intractability conflict.  Kondisi konflik Thailand Selatan menjadi potret 
ketidakmaksimalan negosiasi yang dilakukan oleh kedua belah pihak berkonflik tanpa ada pihak 
ketiga yang menjadi mediator.  Tulisan ini menawarkan strategi lain yang dapat dipergunakan 
dalam penyelesaian konflik dengan melibatkan pihak ketiga. 
 
Kata-kata Kunci: Intractability Conflict, Thailand Selatan, resolusi konflik, pihak ketiga 
Introduction  
 
The conflict in southern Thailand 
between the government of Thailand and the 
Malay-Muslim community has yet to find a 
solution. Although there have been many 
attempts to resolve the conflict as of yet no 
progress has been made, even though the 
media reports both sides have agreed to end 
the conflict. The conflict has not received 
much international attention since the Thai 
government considers it part of their own 
domestic affairs. Nevertheless, evidence is 
mounting that the numbers of casualties from 
both sides in the conflict have been quite 
significant. During the sixty year conflict, 
there have been at least 3000s victims 
(Thnaprarnsing: 2009).  
In 2004 there was an escalation in the 
violence and the number of civilian casualties 
increased. The Taksin government was 
criticized by several countries for its handling 
of the matter. At the time, Indonesia offered to 
serve as a peace mediator for both parties, but 
the results of their negotiations did not end the 
dispute. Until now, no other third party has 
come forward to officially offer to mediate the 
conflict. This is what the Thai government 
wants since this will allow them to resolve this 
conflict in their own way.  
The Thai government has created the 
image that the conflict in southern Thailand is 
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no more than a separatist movement and that 
the violence is really just terrorism committed 
by Muslim communities who want to secede 
from the territory of Thailand. However, the 
root of the conflict itself is not widely known 
by the international community.  
This main question of this paper is how 
should the process be started to settle the 
conflict in southern Thailand? In order to 
answer this question it examines to what extent 
the conflict has developed. This study limits its 
analysis of the conflict and examines the peace 
process from 2001 until 2008.  This paper is 
divided into five sections which the first 
section is theoretical framework. The 
theoretical frameworks to analyze the conflict 
are intractability conflict and negotiation.  The 
second section explains the conflict with ties 
on intractability characteristics.  The third 
section examines efforts to solve the conflict.  
Here is will explain the government of 
Thailand policies that influenced by character 
of the regime.  The fourth section is explaining 
alternative for settlement and the last is 
conclusion. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Intractability 
The conflict was identified as 
intractability conflict adhered with the 
characteristics such as; protracted time, 
identity denigration, conflict profitability, 
absence of ripeness, and solution polarization 
(Zartman:2005).  Protraction is definitional 
characteristic of intractable conflict and it is 
self-reinforcing. The importance of protraction 
is not in its numerical duration but in that 
durations’ effect (ibid).  Duration sets up an 
increasing number of hurdles in the course of 
the conflict that add to the problems of treating 
(etymologically, “tracting”) them (ibid).  
Conflicts are folded into the history and 
mythology of the parties, and ideological 
explanation for national efforts and problems, 
and so parties become reliant on them and are 
loath to part with them (Rosoux: 2000 in 
Zartman).  
 Identities in intractable conflicts not 
only are polarized but are actually dependent 
on the denigration of the other.  The polarized 
conflict moves toward intractability when 
identities become zero sum and one identity 
actually depends on demeaning and 
demonizing the other: Being myself requires 
me to put you down and deny your full identity 
as human being (Zartman: 2005).  Profitability 
is a commonplace-someone profits in any 
conflict-and so is an oft-forgotten 
characteristic of lasting conflict, as attention 
focuses much more the costs and losses, the 
pain and suffering that unresolved conflict 
brings to the losers.   
Ripeness as a pressure toward 
negotiation tends to be absent in intractable 
conflict.  Instead of a mutually hurting 
stalemate pushing the parties into a search for 
solutions, there is only a stable, soft, self-
serving (4-S) stalemate that is preferable to any 
attainable solutions and the uncertainties of a 
search for them (Zartman: 1996 in Zartman: 
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2005).  Solutions in intractable conflicts also 
tend to be polarized.  Solutions are related to 
the other characteristic of ripeness, a way out 
(Zartman: 2000 in Zartman: 2005).  Whereas 
many conflicts are pulled toward one salient 
solution but experience difficulties in the 
process of getting there, intractable are 
generally characterized by the competing pulls 
of two salient solutions, posing an extreme 
Prisoners’ Dilemma or collaboration problem, 
where noncooperation, though mutually 
hurtful, is the outcome logically preferred to 
unilateral attempts at cooperation 
(Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger: 1997 in 
Zartman: 2002). 
 
Negotiation 
Definition of negotiation is a process 
by which states and other actors communicate 
and exchange proposals in an attempt to agree 
about the dimensions of conflict termination 
and their future relationship (Bercovitch and 
Jackson: 2001).   In negotiation, there are three 
strategies for agreement namely: Contending, 
problem-solving, and yielding (Pruitt: 2002).  
In contending, negotiators pursue their goals 
by trying to persuade the other party to 
concede.  This strategy is sometimes called 
competition (Thomas: 1976 in Pruitt: 2002)), 
distributive bargaining (Walton and McKersie: 
1965 in Pruitt: 2002)), or claiming value.  In 
problem solving, negotiators try to identify 
options that satisfy both parties’ goals.  This 
strategy is sometimes called collaboration, 
integrative bargaining, or creating value (ibid: 
2002).  In yielding, involves diminishing one’s 
goals that is, reducing one’s aspiration.  This 
strategy is also sometimes called 
accommodation (ibid: 2002). 
 
Understanding the Conflict in Southern 
Thailand 
The conflict in southern Thailand is 
shaped by many complex factors. This conflict 
can be categorized as an insurgency according 
to the following characteristics. The first 
characteristic is the protraction or the duration 
of the conflict. This conflict first emerged in 
the 1940s and until now it has not been 
resolved. Because the conflict has gone on so 
long new additional issues have been added. 
Originally the complaint was against the 
minority cultural assimilation policy of the 
Thai government which emphasized the 
cultural principle of Buddhist singles in 1938 
(Croissants: 2005). As it would develop later 
on, this conflict would be seen as a conflict of 
religion and culture.  
 The second characteristic has to do 
with identity. Since the beginning of the 
conflict, one of the complaints of the Malay-
Muslim community has to do with the 
preservation of their identity. This is 
influenced by historical factors since the 
southern region of Thailand was a sultanate 
and at one time belonged to the Kingdom of 
Siam. The province of Pattani, Yala, 
Narathiwat, and Satun once constituted “ 
Patani Raya” or Greater Patani, wedged 
between the Siamese empire to its north and 
the Malacca Sultan to its south (Harish: 2006).  
Although it was the target of influence of both 
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neighbors, their domains of authority diverged.  
Culturally, the people of Patani were aligned 
with Malacca but politically, they found 
themselves under Siamese suzerainty (ibid: 
2006). 
The third characteristic is profitability. 
The continued conflict in southern Thailand 
can be used as a justification for the 
government's support of the military's role in 
maintaining stability. The military is fairly 
dominant in Thailand and even the policies of 
the Prime Minister come mostly from the 
military (Moss: 2009).  
The fourth characteristic is the ripeness 
of the conflict. The conflict in Thailand has 
been renewed became the Thai government is 
determined to resolve this issue their way (see 
figure 1). Although the conflict has lasted 
nearly sixty years, the government has no 
desire to invite a third party to mediate this 
conflict. Some parties such as the governments 
of Indonesia and Malaysia have only 
unofficially helped to facilitate a dialogue 
between both parties.  Like the Thaksin 
government which is pre-occupied with 
preventing the internationalization of the 
conflict and has gone great lengths in 
attempting to convince the international 
community that the discord in southern 
Thailand is an internal problem (Harish: 2006) 
The fifth characteristic is the solution. 
This conflict has now polarized the region. The 
Thai government still desires to maintain the 
southern region as part of Thailand, while the 
rebels want their own autonomy to be able to 
join with Malaysia which is the root of their 
culture. 
 
Efforts in the Peace Process to end the 
conflict 
In intractable conflict, there are three 
options for settlement namely; let the conflict 
settle itself, conflict management, and 
mediation and conflict resolution (Crocker, 
Hampson, and Aall: 2009).  The conflict in 
southern Thailand tends to option two which 
conflict management by the government of 
Thailand.  Typically, this involves freezing the 
conflict, through a negotiated and durable 
cease-fire and the subsequent, long-term 
deployment of outside forces (ibid). 
Since this conflicted emerged, no third 
party has come forward to officially try to 
mediate the conflict. The process of conflict 
resolution has been monopolized by the 
government of Thailand and they continue to 
adopt a military approach to try to solve this 
matter. However, this approach has caused a 
recent escalation of conflict. In 2004, the 
administration of Taksin Sinawatra came down 
hard on the rebels. This resulted in 440 people 
being killed. This tragedy is known as the Tak 
Bai tragedy (Harish: 2006). It was this tragedy 
that triggered an international response 
condemning the incident, especially among 
Muslim majority countries. Taksin was 
preoccupied with the search for a security 
solution and used his manpower and resources 
accordingly. He seemed to believe that the 
effective use of military force in combination 
with the arrest and persecution of militant 
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suspects would be able to bring this 
configuration under control (Jitpiromrsi and 
McCargo: 2008). 
 
The changing tone of Thailand’s new 
military-backed Prime Minister Surayud 
Chulanont and his emphasis on reconciliation 
raised hopes for ending the decade’s long crisis 
in Thailand's Southernborder provinces of 
Patani, Yala, Narathiwat and Songkhla 
province. The violence in the South was used 
as one of the key justifications for the 
bloodless coup that ousted Thaksin Shinawatra 
in September 2006 (Horstmann: 2007). 
In his first visit to the South, Surayud 
importantly apologized for the excesses of the 
previous government. Surayud promised to 
establish a constructive dialogue with all 
parties concerned and that he would use the 
recommendations of the National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) as his 
guideposts.  Since the coup the new 
government has also made efforts to improve 
its ties with Malaysia and Indonesia. In 
November 2006, when Prime Minister 
Surayud visited Jakarta, he praised the peace 
process in Aceh as a model of Thailand should 
emulate. In 2006 Indonesia unofficially tried to 
facilitate dialogue between representatives of 
both warring parties to discuss the conflict in 
Bogor (Adnkronos: 2006). During this 
meeting, the new Thai government sent five 
negotiators. Their delegation was chaired by 
General Khwanchart Klahar, the supreme 
Commander of the southern Border Province 
Peace Building Command (SBPPC), who 
oversees the country's southern provinces. 
While the Muslims were represented by 
leaders of the Pattani Malay Consultative 
Congress (PMCC), an umbrella organization 
of insurgency groups in Southern Thailand. 
According to a spokesman for the Indonesian 
government, both sides have agreed that the 
settlement should be conducted peacefully 
through dialogue and should be in accordance 
with the Constitution of Thailand. 
In these talks the two sides tried to 
adopt a problem-solving strategy. However, 
the dialogue quickly turned to a discussion of 
the lawsuit the Muslim party had filed to 
introduce Islamic law and their desire to make 
Pattani Malay (Yawi) the working language in 
the region, as well as other issues concerning 
the improvement of the local economy and 
education system. However, it was 
immediately apparently that neither party 
trusted each other so that these negotiations did 
not continue. The Thai government and some 
of the parties tried to reach a negotiation 
during the Langkawi Talk but these talks also 
failed. 
The deadlock in negotiations between 
the Thailand government and rebels cannot be 
separated from the symmetry power in 
negotiating of both sides. The Thai 
government has a source of legitimacy and 
recognition from other countries including 
ASEAN which cannot intervene in this conflict 
because it concerns Thailand's internal affairs. 
The rebels also have a source of financial 
support from countries like Saudi Arabia, 
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Qatar and Kuwait which support Islamic 
education in southern Thailand (Harish: 2006). 
Even organizations such as the Islamic 
development bank also provide scholarships 
for students to study Islam Pattani in the 
Middle East.  It also postulated that fund were 
come from Libya and extended pro-Patani 
student organization in the Middle East which 
may have increased the means and the 
legitimacy of the armed conflict (Moss:2009). 
These outside influences have created a 
condition of symmetrical forces. This 
condition of symmetrical forces has 
complicated all attempts to achievement an 
agreement. New findings suggest that 
asymmetry is more propitious to achieving 
effective negotiations than near symmetry 
(Hornstein: 1965, Pruitt and Carnevale: 1993, 
Zartman and Rubin: 2000 in Zartman: 2002). 
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Phase Central Government Policy 
on Southern Persistence 
Movement Action 
1959-69 Hard Policy: 
Military campaign cultural 
assimilation 
BNPP, BRN, PULO groups 
formed for separatist state Guerilla 
action initiated against military and 
infrastructure 
1970-75 Hard Policy: 
7-years full-scale war 
Armed campaigns rises to highest 
level since inception of groups 
1975-79 Hard Policy: 
Cont.military presence 
Resources drained: seek 
international support and fund; 
Decreased violence but sustained 
at lower; 
Popular uprisings, police brutality 
sustain separatist cause 
1980-93 Soft Policy: 
Economic development, 
Cultural diversity 
Mediating structures 
Amnesty 
Hundreds accept amnesty Malays 
increase participation in allied 
political parties 
New Organization Bersatu formed 
to coordinate activities BRN-C 
agrees to peace accord with 
military law level of violence, 
sporadic 
1994-96 Hard Policy: 
Peace accord 
Declare void 
Government “cracks down” 
Increased violence in direct 
response to broken peace 
agreement: groups take advantage 
of Thai government instability 
1997-00 Hard and Soft Policy: 
Amnesty offered 
Con’t punitiveness 
Few accept amnesty 
Violent activity remains frequent 
2001-06 Hard Policy: 
War on drugs 
Denial of grievances 
Mediating structures 
Dismantled 
Martial Law 
Protestors killed 
Economic development 
Violence increases against 
increased 
Military presence 
Infrastructure and development 
projects targeted 
Any person seen as allied with the 
Tai state is targeted 
2006-08 Hard Policy: 
State of emergency 
Martial law retained 
SBPAC reopen 
Violence sustained: terrorist tactics 
sustained 
Figure 1: Violent Resistance and Policies, 1959-2008 
Source:  Dana M. Moss available at  
http://www.publications.villanova.edu/Concept/2009/Moss.pdf 
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Alternative settlement 
There have been some attempts to offer 
a solution to the conflict in southern Thailand 
as proposed by the NRC (National 
Reconciliation Commission). The National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC), a body set 
up to propose policy alternatives in the South, 
recommended a range of measures designed to 
address issues of justice and identity as well as 
other socio-economic grievances. At the same 
time, the NRC tried to steer clear of directly 
addressing governance and decentralization 
issues (Jitpiromrsi and McCargo: 2008). 
Since the events of the Tai Bak, many 
stakeholders demanded the government of 
Thailand resolving the conflict. Ideally, both 
parties invite a third party to mediate this 
conflict. I think that given the fairly long 
duration of conflict and the history of 
negotiations that always ended in deadlock 
then it is important that third parties are 
involved to help end the conflict. ASEAN is 
actually an ideal mediator, but if you compare 
this case with the case of Aceh in Indonesia it 
would perhaps be better if mediation is 
conducted by an outside party that is more 
neutral. 
Many people think that with a 
population of less than 2 million people, 
compared with all the people of Thailand are 
as high as 60 million people, the injustice that 
is felt by the people of Pattani not international 
issues. For Southeast Asia, this issue should 
not be allowed to drag on because it can affect 
the stability of the region. Therefore, the media 
in Southeast Asia has a major interest for the 
issue of southern Thailand that aims to build 
peace. While at the national level, the 
mainstream of media and community in 
Thailand can work together to advocate for 
human rights violations and to influence 
government policy of Thailand. At the 
community level, to keep the dispute is not 
protracted into inter-community disputes; the 
community of media such as radio can 
contribute to building a peaceful dialogue 
between the people of Pattani and Thai. In this 
context, all types of media can be used 
strategically to build peace and good solution 
for South Thailand. 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion is the Thai government 
tends to make conflict management as strategy. 
This conflict is deliberately maintained for the 
benefit of elites in this case the military. Some 
of the policies were put Thailand in "Martial 
law" situation.  It enhances the role of the 
military as well as the budget to deal with 
conflicts on the border. However, this policy is 
not effective to curb the rebellion because the 
situation was even more resistant. This 
condition is even more draining the 
government.  That why it is required an 
alternative to immediately resolve the conflict.  
The most appropriate option is to invite third 
parties to be involved as mediators. 
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